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However odd it may appear, still the problem will remain a timely 
one: at present namely many of the experts of criminality, both crimi­
nalists and criminologists question or reject the search for the causes 
of criminality or criminal human behaviours. This sceptical or negative 
point of view manifests itself in the first place on the part of certain 
experts of criminality of the western countries. Still a dissenting appraisal 
of the problem may be encountered also in the works of socialist spe­
cialist. It appears therefore to be justified to throw out a few ideas in 
this connection.
At the end of the 19th century, when it was about to develop to 
a discipline of its own, criminology gained independence exactly because 
it embarked on the study of new aspects of criminality and criminal 
human behaviour, the causal relations, the “why” of the origins and 
existence of criminality, and on the ground so explored, on the study 
of the chances of prevention. It is the general belief that even today 
etiology is one of the fundamental scopes of criminology, that the princi­
pal objective of criminology is to offer an answer to the question, why 
did X.Y. commit a criminal offence, and even more, why the X.Y.’s 
commit criminal offences at all, i.e. why there is criminality and why 
does it change in the manner it changes, and finally, how could crimi­
nality be changed so as to become less dangerous to society for both its 
volume and structure.
1. W estern criminological opinions of the futility of the pragmatic 
method of research
Still let us see from where do those denying, or at least querying the 
existence of causality set out in their studies. Robert Maclver in one of 
his treatises writes: “It is vain to seek the cause of crime as such, of 
crime anywhere and everywhere. Crime is a legal category. The only 
thing that is alike in all crimes is that they are alike violations of law. 
In that sense the only cause of crime as such is the law itself. What is
a crime in one country is no crime in another; what is a crime at one 
time is no crime at another.” He then continues: "It has no inherent 
quality or property attaching to it as such, attaching to crime of all 
categories under all conditions. If indeed we do raise the question: 
Why crime? We are asking merely why people are so constituted that 
they violate laws under any conditions whatever. The question has no 
more specific significance than the question: Why human nature?”1
In fact there can he no talk of eauslity, where criminal law itself 
has been made the sole cause of the criminal offence. If this “interre­
lation" were accepted as a fact, criminality could he put an end to in 
a very simple manner. The problem could be solved with a single legi­
slative act. All that has to be done is to set aside the rules of criminal 
law and there would he no more criminal offences. Or simply the machi­
nery of criminal judicature has to be laid off and its personnel given 
other assignments. 'Phis approach turned topsyturvy has hut one expla­
nation, namely that its partisan wants in the first place or exclusively 
to discover a formal violation of the law in the criminal offence. The 
real content of the offence, i.e. its danger to society, recedes to the back­
ground, or has become insensible. In our opinion criminology, if it wants 
to adhere to its original function, has to remember that there are cri­
minal offences (behaviours to a high degree dangerous to society) not 
because the offence has been made criminal by criminal law, but because 
the state declares certain form of human behaviour to be acts to be pro­
secuted with special means, i. e. to be criminal acts, because they implv 
danger to society, and in the opinion of the legislator these special means 
of criminal law may be used most effectively against them. Therefore 
a causal relation should be sought between the criminal offences and the 
phenomena which produce human behaviours dangerous to society and 
entailing sanctions of criminal law.
From the second part of the quotation it is evident that in the 
author’s opinion the causes of the crime, if this has a meaning at all, 
may be discovered in human nature. Not only socialist eriminologv but 
also the majority of western criminologists considers this causal concept 
of criminology, far away from the sociological approach, discredited.
Strictly speaking it is due to the legal concept of the criminal offence 
subject to changes in space and in the temporal order that the author 
adopts a point of view denying the causal relation. Still even other 
western criminologists give expression to their opinion that criminology 
is at a loss when it comes to tackle the legal concept of the criminal 
offence. According to Thorsten Sellin the acceptance of the legal notion 
of the criminal offence and of the offender renders criminological rese­
arch superfluous and criminology has to free itself of the fetters forged 
by criminal law. According to this author the criminal and non-criminal 
acts cannot on causal grounds be segregated from one another with 
any accurancv, the result, i.e. the criminal act being void of any precise 
notion. Still Sellin doubts the regular character of the causal relation 
also in general, and not only for this reason. In his opinion science has
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already given up the notion of cause. Where it is nevertheless applicable 
it is the field of functional relations between the elements and facts.2
It may suffice perhaps to quote the doctrine of Manual Lopez-Rey 
as one denying causality. Lopez-Rey in a recently published paper, 
otherwise amply interspersed with excellent factual material writes 
as follow : “As a rule crime is still regarded as a causal entity the causes 
of which will eventually lie persistent criminological research and evcn- 
tuelly suppressed or considerably reduced. My contention is that crime 
is a conceptual and not a causal or natural entity, i.e. it is what, at a 
historical juncture, is defined as such by the legitimate order in accor­
dance with a changeable but always fundamental system of values 
and the structure and aims of a given society. . . .  As a conceptual 
entity the meaning and extent of crime changes more in accordance 
with the evolution of fundamental values and socio-economic, as well 
as political aims than as a result of the discovery of its “causes”. . . . 
Contemporary criminology tries unsuccessfully to avoid this conceptual 
character of crime by using such vague concepts as deviant or deviance 
or by styling itself a meta-science entitled to coin its own definition of 
crime”.3
From the doctrines here presented it is obvious that the denial or 
the calling into doubt of the causality of criminality and criminal human 
behaviour by certain western criminologists may in the first place be 
explained by the legal, “ideal constructive” character of the notion of 
the criminal offence. The fact that the notion of the criminal offence 
and the sphere of phenomena qualified as such is subject to changes in 
space as well as in the temporal order, has created in a part of the cri­
minalist the impression as if they were confronted by a phenomenon 
which depends on legislation at any time, its consequence, its “result” 
and not by a natural causal phenomenon. The representatives of this 
idea are right in so far as the notion of the crime and also of criminality 
is of legal character and has social-political contents. This circumstance 
does not, however, preclude the real, objective nature of the crime and 
criminality, and cannot question the recognition of the fact that the 
violation of the exigencies of society at any time comes also within the 
system of universal causality, i.e. the behaviour infringing the punitive 
norms has also its causes and conditions. As far as we know and believe 
the exploration of the causes of human behaviour in a manner indepen­
dent of the regulation of criminal law was never, and cannot even be, 
the function of criminology. It is not the function of criminology e.g. 
to find the causes of bodily lesion caused by another man. What comes 
within the province of criminology is the exploration of the causes and 
conditions of the causation of harmful lesions brought about in defiance 
of the provisions of criminal law and involving dangers to society. It is 
on this understanding that a surgical operation may be segregated from 
the behaviour of a rowdy, violent person of fighting disposition. Or 
there is yet another example: The causation of slight damage in social 
property in order to stave off the supervention of considerable losses.
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In this behaviour the spirit to protect social property prevails as con­
trasted to the acts of the looters of property.
Hence criminal etiological research before all answers the question 
why does a group of men (those of the offenders) infringe the norms of cri­
minal law in the one way or the other, or why this group does not conform 
to the demands of society. It would he a denial of reality to assert that 
the violation of the demands of society manifesting themselves in the 
norms of criminal law is void of causes or that it is an irrational human 
behaviour. Such an approach to the question would conflict with the 
materialist-deterministic concept. In our opinion, however, socialist 
criminology has to set out from this fundamental concept.
2. The meaning and the role of the pragmatic method of research 
in socialist criminology
The criminological literature of the socialist countries in general 
recognize the existence of causality and the importance of its study. The 
causal relation has been accepted as an objective category, a relation 
independent of our consciousness between the phenomena of nature and 
those of society, and so between criminal human behaviour and the 
objective phenomena determining it.4 Among socialist authors disputes 
or dissentient opinions before all emerge at the interpretation of causlitv. 
Some of the authors recognize the dynamic form only of causality and 
consider the introduction of statistical, stochastic relations into crimi­
nology superfluous.5 Others believe that statistical regularity or sta­
tistical laws are dominant also in criminality.1’ Vet others come to the 
conclusion that owing to the defective contents of the doctrine of cau­
sality the convenient way is to concentrate on objectives somewhat more 
modest than the pragmatic method of research, e.g. the study of the 
process of the development of a person to a criminal.7 According to 
J. Molnar the study of the process of turning criminal may be segre­
gated from the pragmatic method of research. “Namely in any crimi­
nological research of an etiological nature the criminal offence will mani­
fest itself as a concrete human act and not as the abstraction of unlawful 
human behaviours. Once the criminal offence has been committed 
research will have to be directed to the demonstration of the factçrs in 
whose presence the concrete determining process leading to the per­
petration of the act took place.8
In fact, criminology has to study the process determining the per­
petration of the concrete crime, still in our opinion criminology has been 
called for yet more. It cannot content itself with the exploration and 
formulation of individual causlitv, it has to investigate also what is 
common or general in the many concrete and unique causal relations, 
what is characteristic of the whole, of criminality itself. It is only in this 
way that the laws of criminality, as a mass phenomenon of society, can 
be explored, of the laws namely which to a lesser or higher degree permit
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the prediction of the likely behaviour of the individuals or of the fre­
quency of the occurence of the phenomena in question. Prognostication 
of criminality may then be built upon these laws. This prognostication 
will eventually become the basis for planned guidance of prevention or 
for the effective prosecution of criminality. Criminology cannot therefore 
content itself with the individual approach to the problem so supreme in 
criminal judicature. Beyond this, and in the first place, the mass pheno­
menon approach has to be given prominence, i.e. the laws criminality 
as a whole has to be explored.
In connection with the pragmatic method of research problems of 
extreme significance have been raised by Dr. L. Viski in his dissertation 
for an academic doctor’s (Dr. SC.) degree.9 In this dissertation an attem pt 
has been made to draw the outlines of an omni-factorial and integrated 
theory of criminality of field approach or method. The adjective omni­
factorial wants to indicate that in research work all factors have to be 
considered which are instrumental in the perpetration of the criminal 
offence. The term integration applies in the course of the study of the 
criminal offence to the joint recourse to the legal, sociological and psycho­
logical approach. The term field approach substantially implies that 
the criminal offence comes into being as the combined effect of the 
various spheres of the circumstances of living.
In our opinion these basic theses or postulates are in general correct 
and reflect reality. In issues of detail, however, considerable differences 
will come to light. Socialist criminological literature, and within it, 
Hungarian, has proclaimed these ideas already before, if even not wholly 
with these contents and under this heading, but simply without labelling 
them.10
The ideas of the author on the relations of the integrated theory of 
criminality and criminology deserves better attention and in our opinion 
a more precise formulation. Unfortunately within the scope of the present 
paper it is impossible to enlarge on all that deserves recognition and 
criticism in Viski’s paper. Here we have to confine ourselves to prob­
lems coming within the province of causality. Let us begin the following 
discussion witli a quotation from Viski’s work: “As regards the etiolo­
gical approach the integrated theory of criminality has to consider the 
notion of “the” criminal offence or of “the” criminal an inadmissible 
abstraction, where the criminal law contesting behaviour displayed may 
constitute the only generalizable common trait. As regards the particular 
types of behaviour, however, provided that typization is “systematic 
and realistic” it is imaginable that unchanging and uniform theories of 
causality, may be formed which also gets rid of the absurdity of the 
wide eclecticism.* It is therefore meaningless to explore in general the 
“causes of criminality”: “The criminality has no more causes than the 
human behaviour in general. Or more exactly: the causes of criminality 
are identical with those of the human behaviour” .** In addition! “The 
forcing the phenomenon of criminality into the bed of Procrustes of 
cause and effect” is a theoretical error: The exclusive application of the
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causal analysis includes the same logical error as the antropocentric 
explanation of the animal behaviour”.***’1
This quotation put together of the words of others is obscure and 
hard to grasp.
According to the latter part of the quotation it is an error of prin­
ciple to force the phenomenon of criminality into the bed of Procrustes 
of cause and effect. In fact it is not the sole characteristic of criminality 
that, like any other phenomenon, it fits into the universal system of 
causal interrelations. Apart from this criminality has several other 
essential properties: e.g. it has dynamics and a structure. It is for this 
reason that the statement is correct. Still as regards socialist literature 
of criminology, so far we could neither read nor hear as it anyone had 
identified the knowledge relating to criminality with etiological doct­
rines. As regards modern western doctrines of criminology many come 
to the conclusion tha t the exploration of the causes of criminality must 
be prohibited (see Viski, op. cit., note***) because many identify the 
causal relations, the causal mechanism, i.e. causality with causality pre­
vailing in mechanical phenomena, and therefore “rightly” protest against 
the generalization of cause and effect.
Still in the sphere of human behaviour, and so also of criminal 
human behaviours, there are other kinds of causal relations namely causal 
relations of which interactions and not only the cause and effect relation, 
are characteristic. Thus causal analysis, too, has attained a different 
meaning. It would have been the proper course had Viski in his paper 
referred to these facts, facts which in another part of his paper he dis­
cusses correctly, and did not permit the reader to come to a conclusion 
as if he were in agreement with the relevant passage of the quotation.
In Hungarian professional literature, however, there are authors 
who speak with scepticism of the rule of causality in criminal human 
behaviours. By way of example let us quote from the dissertation of 
Imre Bébés for the degree of a candidate:
“The question whether the individual may be held morally respon­
sible for the faults of his faculties, i.e. attention, foresight, automatism, 
etc., or the deficiencies of will, the wrong structure of personality, or 
because man has a causal fate only but no life, cannot be answered in 
a manner confirmed bv evidence. In accordance with my point of view 
until the natural sciences do not convince mankind (not those learned in 
law, but the broadest public opinion) of the causal nature of cogitation 
and in general of the psychic processes, and until men attribute a moral 
significance to the behaviour of their own and of an vbod v else, until the 
illusion of “1 could have done it otherwise” and the feeling of a remorse 
of conscience are still alive, the jurisprudents will have to recognize the 
cooperation of the individual as joint author in the moulding of his 
carrer, his intellectual, sentimental and emotional world, in the deve­
lopment of his character and actual behaviour.12
'I’he fact that Békés places the life of man in juxtaposition to the 
causal fate of man, that he does not seem to believe in the existence of
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causality in the criminal human behaviour confirmed by evidence, 
originates in our opinion from the incorrect interpretatition of causality, 
from the identification of mechanical causality and “the” causality. 
Without enlarging on the details of the issue we would simply make it 
clear that the causal pattern of conscious human behaviours, their 
causal mechanism, substantially differ from causality as dominating in 
mechanics, or in a wider sense, in the world of nature. Among the sub­
jective causes of acts (and so also criminal acts) performed by man there 
will always exist final causes, the anticipated pictures of possible future 
behaviours adequate for the satisfaction of needs. Engels appositely 
remarks: “The causes of the acts of man appear in tire forms of the ends, 
the desires of man. This is what is new in point of principle, this is by 
what causality in the life of society differs from causality in nature.”*3 
Hence for the purpose of the fight against criminality the proper inter­
pretation of causality and the exact as possible exploration of the causal 
factors is needed rather than the denial of causality or the prohibition of 
the exploration of causes.
The second thesis of Viski’s quotation deserving notice qualifies 
the exploration of the causes of criminality in general as meaningless, 
the causes of criminality being identical with those of human behaviour.
In the history of criminology, when efforts were made for the for­
mulation of the most general causes of criminality, often erroneously 
the causes of criminality were formulated on the level of general human 
behaviour. E. Ferri, when he created his theory based on three factors, 
and traced the criminal offences to the (1) anthropological effects, 
(2) to those of the social factors, and, (3) to those of the physical environ­
ments, strictly speaking formulated the causal factors of human beha­
viour. In the same way neither are the endogenous and exogenous factors 
of Liszt specially the causal factors of criminality only, but those of all 
human behaviours. When now the coupling of criminality and causal 
factors on this level is kept, in view, the statement will become under­
standable that criminality has no more causes than human behaviour 
itself, or more precisely, the causes of human behaviour are the causes of 
criminality.
Logically this coupling is, however, errenoeus since no sign of equ­
ality can be inserted between the causes of human behaviours and those 
of criminality, the two being phenomena appearing on different levels. 
Criminal human behaviours answer only for a part, or a group, of the 
totality of human behaviours, a part or group which with the epithet 
“criminal” is kept apart from other (non-criminal) human behaviours. 
It therefore within the sphere of phenomena we examine a group only 
of the multitude (of human behaviours), namely that of the criminal 
acts and not the whole, even within the sphere of causes a line will have 
to be drawn between the multitude as whole and the part multitude, i.e. 
here too there is need for the segregation of the group of general causes, 
i.e. the biological, social and physical factors, distinguished by some 
sort of an epithet. This is the fundamental postulate of statistical clas-
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si f icat ion. For the purpose of criminology this means that it will not 
suffice to trace back the causes of criminality to the effects of the biolo­
gical, social and physical factors in general. It has to be made clear at 
the same time which biological, social and physical factors may be re­
garded as causal factors. In this case it will be obvious at once that on 
the level of mass phenomena law-abiding behaviours helping the inter­
ests of society to domination will in general have causes other than 
criminal behaviours i.e. behaviours ignoring the interests of others.
It remains a fact though that on exploring the causes of criminality 
лее shall not discover factors existing only in offenders, or such as may 
be found in each offender. It does not follow, however, that the explo­
ration of the causes of criminality should be prohibited. Incidentally 
this conclusion is inconsistent, for neither in the types of criminal offen­
ces can causal factors of this kind be discovered, although according to 
the quotation their causal research and the development of theories of 
causality relating to these is virtually possible.
At present the idea is fairly weil established that for the criminal 
offences several causal factors (causes and conditions), i.e. the joint 
effects of the “omnifactors” have to account. Thus the recurrence of 
criminal offences is not the consequence of the recurrence of a single cause, 
but of the constellation of the causal factors.14 It does not follow, however, 
that the elements (causal factors) of the constellation, accounting for the 
commission of the criminal offence do not occur in causal constellations 
eliciting noncriminal human behaviours. What follows, however, and 
what appears to be borne out by criminological research work, is that 
tliere are causal factors which occur in the causal constellation leading 
to the perpetration of the offence with a frequency greater than in con­
stellations bringing forth non-criminal human behaviours.
In modern criminology these not exclusively, still often significantly 
recurring causal factors (causes and conditions) which pave the way to 
criminal offences have received the designation of criminogenous. Unlike 
certain western criminologists socialist criminologists attribute a meaning 
to the designation of these factors, in particular when they can tell what 
other factors are associated with them, i.e. what constallations leading 
to the perpetration of offences are of most frequent occurence.
Naturally against this reasoning the argument may be brought 
forward that so far no allround survey has produced data of the fre­
quency of the occurence of what are called criminogenous factors. 
Whole populations have not yet been examined for the occurence of 
factors called criminogenous in them. There are no records of surveys 
(probably because it is unlikely that ever such surveys have taken place) 
where to the totality of offenders so to say as a control group (the to ta­
lity of those having a clean record would have been placed) in juxtapo­
sition. There are on the other hand data of the rate of certain factors 
e.g. illiteracy, hostile attitude to work, etc. in the one or the other mul­
titude. Undoubtedly an in the strict sense of the term all-round survey 
might be of considerable interest and might even produce in very respect
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conclusive evidence. Still in our opinion it would be unfounded to bring 
forward claims to such a survey, and perhaps there is not even need for 
one. Representative surveys made so far with control groups15 bear 
testimony to the fact that sample multitudes excellently (with departures 
of a  few per cent’s only) represent the multitide as a whole. And these 
surveys confirm that the causal factors of criminal and non-criminal 
human behavoiours present different structures and rates widely apart 
from one another.
From what has been set forth so far by way of inference we may 
state that the abstraction of the notions of “the” criminal offence and of 
“the” offender is not unwarranted, even on etiological considerations if 
the notion of criminality is tied to space, time and a definite system of 
criminal law. In this case it is exactly the as exact as possible delimitation 
of the notions of the criminal offence and of the offender which permits 
the institution of a census of concrete crimes and offenders, i.e. the study 
of criminality as mass phenomenon. Certain western criminologists 
proclaim the incompatibility of the infringement of criminal law as 
fundamental criterion of all criminal offences and the pragmatic method 
of research, because in this case it is the causes of the infringement of 
rules in general that have to be explored and not those of murder or 
theft. In their opinion there is a difference of “valuation” only bet ween 
criminal and non-criminal human behaviours on the level of criminality. 
This remains a fact. Set this social and legal valuation in general ref­
lects objective realities or substantial differences of contents even when 
the boundary between criminal and non-criminal human behaviours is 
an artificial one, and along this boundary differences tend to fade away. 
We always have to keep in sight that even criminal human behaviours 
constitute a continuous series between the purely positive and purely 
negative poles, with condensations towards the latter. It is exactly this 
continuity which insists on the careful drawing of the line of partition, 
on the precise definition of the notions of the criminal offence and the 
offender.
From the causal point of view this trend of thought indicates that 
in the course of the exploration of the causes of criminality as a whole 
the issue will in fact emerge in the first place in the form of why the 
offenders infringe the norms of criminal law, why they do not conform 
to the postulates of society, which are the most frequently occuring 
causal factors or causal constellations which lead to the perpetration of 
criminal offences. When it comes to the study of the internal structure 
or the categories of criminal offences as a matter of course the problem 
will cease to lie only one of the causes of the infringement of the norms 
of society. The problem will in the first place become one of why a parti­
cular type of norm have been infringed. Still not even on this level, no­
tably on the level of the typical a causal factor or factors can be disco­
vered which without exception may be retrieved in all offences coming 
within the sphere of the typical. What is true, however, is that, as related 
to non-criminals, there is a significance in general higher than for cri-
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minais or offenders. Still for research continued on both levels, criminal 
and non-crirtnnal, it is in general agreed that causal factors oecuring 
with great frequency are characteristic of the multitude (of the whole or 
the type). (It is not necessary that these factors should manifest them­
selves in each individual without exception). Such significant causal 
factors or causal relations determine the law of criminality. This law 
or regularity will then be projected from past to future, and it is on this 
ground that prognoses can be made at all and that the necessary measu­
res can be planned.
In our opinion in westerns criminology “great, comprehensive” 
general monocausal theorias provided with a variety of labels make 
there appearance because the authors of these theories are forced to 
formulate parts of reality in an exact manner, whereas instead of recog­
nizing and enforcing the materialist concept postulated for synthetization 
or integration, or for the formulation of regularities and laws, they 
prefer to generalize the results of their research work covering parts of 
the whole only. Viski is right when he writes that these causal theories 
defy generalization. Still the scholars of socialist criminology may openly 
and unambiguously state that materialist determinism, universal causal 
regularity dominate also in the sphere of criminal human behaviour. 
The causal relations may owing to the discrepancies of phenomena pre­
sent divergent forms, still their existence cannot be denied. The methods 
of research of socialist criminology may be adequate or less adequate, 
still these methods will in any case have to relv on dialectics. The value 
or usefulness of the causal theories of criminology will before all depend 
on the degree of exactness with which theory will be capable of formulat­
ing the causal regulatiries of criminality, and on the extent to which it 
demonstrates the mechanism of causal determination in criminal human 
behaviour.
With this presentation and valuation of some of the problems of 
causality selected at random it has been our intention to make it clear 
that causality is a cardinal issue of criminology and a field not yet pro­
perly cleared up. The fact that certain western criminologists, some of 
them well-known and generlallv recognized scholars, deny causality or 
call into doubt the significance of the pragmatic method of research of 
criminality, does not of necessity betray the crisis of the principle of crimi­
nological causality. It is, however, an indication of the need for yet 
greater attention to be applied to the study of the issue and to the clari­
fication of the concepts. This is borne out also by the circumstance that 
socialist experts of criminalistics, who though recognize the existence of 
causality in criminal human behaviour, the importance of the study of 
this causality, depart from one another widely in the interpretation of 
the notions. In our opinion this divergence of interpretation is accounted 
for by a confusion or inaccuracies of notions. Socialist criminology consi­
ders the pragmatic method of research the study of reality, of really 
existing relations, and therefore it insists on the pragmatic method of 
research of criminality and on the clearing up of the issues of causality.
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О ПРАВЕ НА СУЩЕСТВОВАНИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ ПРИЧИН 
ПРЕСТУПНОСТИ
Д-р ЙОЖЕФ ВИГ 
профессор
(Резюме)
Некоторые буржуазные, а даже п социалистические криминологи отрицают 
или ставят под вопрос осуществление и существование причинности каузальности 
в области преступности. Они ссылаются чаще всего на правого-общественный ха­
рактер преступлений, и считают его явлением, находящимся вне сферы каузаль­
ности, в котором нс может осуществляться связь между прпчной и следствием. 
Из этого понятия «но праву» вытекает крайний вывод, что нужно запретить иссле­
дование причин преступности. Социалистическая криминология не можстсогласнться 
с этим понятием, во первых, так как нет такого явления, которое не было бы след­
ствием причин, во вторых, ибо предупреждение преступности может быть осу­
ществлено только с знанием причин.
Подвергается критике и то утверждение, что причинами преступности явля­
ются те же явления, как и другого человеческого поведения. Положение неправиль­
но не только с точки зрения формальной логики, но его несостоятельность может 
быть установлена и путем практики. Преступления, как и другие общественные 
явления имеют много причин, и не тольно наличие причинных факторов, но и их 
констелляция создает возникновение преступления. В области преступности 
причинные отношения не поле-теория Курта Левина Отражает правильно, а кон- 
стел л Я!,ионная теория причинности.
Гиен die existenziierixiitihi m ; »ek i hs uukmoh nuu  m ; пен
K HI M IN ALITAT
von
Dr. JÖ ZSEF VIGH Universilätsprofessor 
(Zusammenfassung)
Munchu bürgerliche, «ber mich sozial!-.t iachr Kriminologen verneinen, oder versehen 
m it einem Fragezeich« n die G eltung oder Existenz der K ausalität au f dem Gebiet der 
K rim inalität. »Sie berufen sich meistens au f den recht lieb-gesellschaftlichen C harakter 
der Verbrechen, und als solches betrachten  sie e s  als ein« Erscheinung außerhalb der 
K ausalität, bei der Zusamm enhang von Ursache und W irkung nicht zur Geltung kommen 
kann. Aus dieser Auffassung kann „m it К ech t44 die extrem e Schlußfolgerung gezogen 
werden, daß die Forschung nach K rim inalitätsm otiven verboten werden muß. Die so­
zialistische Kriminologie kann m it dieser Auffassung nicht einverstanden sein, erstens, 
weil es keine Erscheinung gib t, dir* nicht dir* W irkung von Ursachen wäre, zweitens, 
weil « 1 it* Prävention der Krim inalität nur in K enntnis der Ursachen verwirklicht werden 
kann.
Auch die B ehauptung bedarf der K ritik, daß die Ursachen der Krim inalität die 
selben seien wie die jenigen anderer menschlicher Haltung. Die These ist aber nicht nur 
hinsichtlich der formalen Logik falsch, sondern ihre U nhaltbarkeit ist auch praktisch 
naebzuweisen. Die Verbrechen haben ähnlich wie bei anderen gesellschaftlichen Erschei­
nungen mehrere Ursachen, und nicht nur die Existenz der kausalen Faktoren, sondern 
auch deren Konstellation fühlen zum Zustandekom men des Verbrechens. Die kausalen 
Verhältnisse atıf den; Gebiet der K rim inalität werden nicht durch die Theorie von K urt 
Levin richtig widespicgelt, sondern durch die K onstcllationsursachcntheorie.
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